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A Constitutional Analysis of the New Delaware 
Director-Consent-to-Service Statute 
In Sha.ffer v. Heitner 1 the United States Supreme Court defined the bounda-
ries the due process clause imposes on the power of states to control the activi-
ties of nonresident corporate directors. In Sha.ffer the Court struck down 
Delaware's sequestration method of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident di-
rectors of its corporations.2 The Delaware sequestration statute permitted a 
court to seize a nonresident defendant's property located within the state, 
thereby forcing the defendant either to appear and contest the merits of the 
suit or to default and incur liability for the value of the seized assets.3 The 
Court held that assertion of such jurisdiction violated due process because the 
nonresident directors lacked minimum contacts with the state.4 Thus, Sha.ffer 
effectively restricted the Delaware courts' jurisdiction over nonresident direc-
tors of Delaware corporations.5 
In an attempt to regain state court jurisdiction over nonresident corporate 
directors, the Delaware legislature enacted a statute providing that a nonresi-
dent who accepts a position as a director of a Delaware corporation thereby 
consents to jurisdiction over him in any action arising out of his activities as a 
director.6 The Delaware Supreme Court, in Armstrong v. Pomerance/ ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the new director-consent-to-service statute in 
light of Sha.ffer's due process limitations8 and determined that it complied with 
the due process clause.9 Such statutes nevertheless pose serious due process 
problems when they are construed to permit state courts to exercise jurisdiction 
over nonresidents who have no contact with the forum other than their direc-
torships of state-chartered corporations. 
This note examines the limits the due process clause imposes on state court 
jurisdiction in order to determine whether the Delaware statute is constitu-
tional. The note begins by analyzing both Shf!ifor and the Delaware statute. 
By tracing the evolution of the minimum contacts requirement, the note dem-
onstrates that minimum contacts analysis requires the court to make a 
threshold finding that the individual acted purposefully to create a contact 
with the forum before considering whether the state has a sufficient interest in 
the matter to warrant its exercise of jurisdiction. The note then analyzes the 
Delaware statute in light of this minimun:t contacts test and concludes that the 
statute is unconstitutional because acceptance of a directorship does not consti-
tute a purposeful act sufficient to create minimum contacts. The note examines 
I. 433 u.s. 186 (1977). 
2. 433 U.S. at 212 {invalidating DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 {1974)). 
3. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 {1974). 
4. 433 U.S. at 212. 
5. The sequestration procedure had been the principal means of obtaining personal jurisdiction over 
nonresident corporate directors. Ratner & Schwartz, 'I7te Impact ~?[Shaffer v. Heitner on the Substan-
tive Law ~?(Corporations, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 641, 643 (1979). 
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 {1980). 
7. 423 A.2d 174 (Del 1980). 
8. Id at 176. 
9. Id at 179. 
1209 
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Armstrong v. Pomerance, in which the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the 
statute, and argues that it does not provide an alternative rationale for uphold-
ing the statute. Finally, the note recognizes the need for a limited exception to 
the minimum contacts requirement, but proposes that the principal place of 
business, rather than the state of incorporation, should be the forum for such 
exceptional cases. 
I. SHAFFER AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
In Sha.ffer v. Heitner the plaintiff filed a shareholder derivative suit in Dela-
ware Chancery Court alleging that the directors of Greyhound Corporation 
had violated their fiduciary duties to the corporation. 10 Greyhound was incor-
porated in Delaware, with its. principal place of business in Phoenix, Ari-
zona.11 None of the directors lived in Delaware, and none of the actions in 
question had occurred in Delaware. 12 Unable to obtain personal jurisdiction 
over the nonresident directors because of these circumstances, the plaintiff ob-
tained an order sequestering the defendants' stocks.13 The seq~estration of 
their stocks compelled the nonresident directors to appear, and the court exer-
cised quasi in rem jursdiction over them.14 
The Delaware Chancery Court rejected the defendants' arguments that Del-
aware could not assert jurisdiction over them because they lacked minimum 
contacts with the state.15 Affirming the Chancery Court's decision, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court held that the defendants' contacts with the forum state 
were relevant only when the plaintiff sought in personam jurisdiction.l6 The 
Delaware Supreme Court thus viewed contacts as irrelevant when, as here, the 
plaintiff sought quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the presence of the defend-
ants' stock in Delaware, 17 rather than in personam jurisdiction. 
10. 433 U.S. 186, 189-90 (1977). The plaintiff alleged that the defendant directors breached their 
duties by causing Greyhound Corporation and a Greyhound subsidiary to engage in actions that re-
sulted in liability for substantial damages in a private antitrust suit and a large fine in a criminal 
contempt action. I d. at 190. 
11. /d. at 189. 
12. /d. at 190-91. 
13. I d. The purpose of the sequestration procedure was to compel a nonresident defendant to enter o 
personal appearance. /d. at 193 (quoting Delaware Chancery Court letter opinion in Greyhound Corp. 
v. Heitner). If the non-resident did not appear to defend on the merits, his sequestered property could 
be used to pay a default judgment DEL. CODE ANN. tiL 10, § 366 (1974). Under Delaware low, the 
situs of the corporation's stock is the state of incorporation. /d. at tit. 8, § 169. Thus, the directors' stock 
in Greyhound was statutorily present in the forum, and the court could seize it. 
14. 433 U.S. at 194. Traditionally, a state court must rely on one of three bases for any exercise of 
jurisdiction. If the court's power stems from authority over the defendant's person, the action and 
judgment are in personam. I d. at 199. Courts with in personam jurisdiction can issue judgments affect-
ing all the property of the defendant. Jurisdiction based on a court's power over a defendant's property 
within the state is in rem or quasi in rem./d. In such cases, the judgment is limited to the value of the 
property on which the court has based its jurisdiction. I d. The basis of in rem jurisdiction is property 
present in the state that is the subject of the suit and is owned by the defendant. In rem judgments 
affect the interests of all persons in the designated property. I d. at 199 n.l7. Quasi in rem jurisdiction 
arises when the defendant has property unrelated to the subject matter of the suit in the forum and the 
judgment affects only the interests of the parties in that property. I d. 
15. I d. at 193 (quoting Court of Chancery letter opinion in Greyhound v. Heitner). The defendants 
had entered a special appearance and disputed the sequestration order's validity. Id. at 192-93. 
16. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976), rev'd mh nom. Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 u.s. 186 (1977). 
17. Id 
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Delaware court's 
decision, and held that all assertions of state court jurisdiction, whether in per-
sonam, in rem, or quasi in rem, must be evaluated according to the minimum 
contacts standard of International Shoe Co. v .. Washington .18 Under the mini-
mum contacts test established in International Shoe, a state may exercise juris-
diction over a nonresident if the person has "contacts, ties, and relations" with 
the forum state sufficient to render the exercise of jurisdiction fair. 19 The Shcif-
ftr Court reasoned that because the sequestered property was not the subject 
matter of the suit and was not related to the cause of action, it did not provide 
contacts sufficient to support jurisdiction. 20 The Court then examined the de-
fendants' relationship with Delaware and stated that the defendants' accept-
ance of directorships in a Delaware corporation did not, without more, satisfy 
the minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe .21 
The Court rejected the contention that Delaware's strong interest in super-
vising the management of Delaware corporations justified its assertion of juris-
diction over corporate directors.22 Instead, the Court questioned the interest 
itself, noting that Delaware had not enacted a statute embodying the interest.23 
Even if such an interest did exist, the Court went on, such an interest would 
support the application of Delaware law to the controversy, but could not sup-
ply those minimum contacts that would justify the state's exercise of jurisdic-
tion over the nonresidents.24 The Court also mentioned that because the state 
had not provided notice of its intent to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents 
through a long-arm statute,25 the defendant directors had no reason to expect 
18. 326 U.S. 310 (1945), cited in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,212 (1977). For a discussion of the 
justifications for a lower contacts requirement for quasi in rem jurisdiction than for in personam juris-
diction, see Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: Tlze End of on Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 67-79 (1978). 
19. 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); see notes 40-48 infra and accompanying text (discussing International 
Shoe). 
20. 433 U.S. at 213. 
21. Id at 216-17. Justice Brennan dissented from the portion of the Court's opinion in which the 
Court held that the nonresident directors lacked minimum contacts. Id at 220..28 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan believed that the Court should not have reached 
the question of minimum contacts because the State of Delaware had not purported to base jurisdiction 
on the defendants' contacts with the state. Id at 220:-22. In his view, the issue was not ripe, and the 
Court's opinion was thus only advisory. Id Justice Brennan also argued that state courts generally 
should have jurisdiction to adjudicate shareholder derivative actions involving the conduct and policies 
of directors and officers of a corporation chartered by that state. Id at 222. 
22. Id at 214. 
23. Id 
24. Id at 215. Nevertheless, some co=entators have remarked that the contacts requirment for 
choice of law purposes should be greater than that for jurisdiction because choice of law lias a greater 
impact on the substantive rights of the parties. See Ratner & Schwartz, supra noteS, at 656 (paradoxi-
cal that Delaware interest based on stock ownership insufficient to justify Delaware forum, but act of 
incorporating sufficient to apply Delaware law); Silberman, supra note 18, at 82, 88 (if contacts suffi-
cient to require application of forum's law, forum should also exercise jurisdiction); see also notes 64-70 
i'!fra and accompanying text (discussing relationship between defendant's contacts with forum and 
state's interest in minimum contacts analysis). Justice Brennan, in his Shq!fer dissent, stressed that the 
jurisdictional inquiry and the choice oflaw inquiry are more closely related than the Shq!fer opinion 
indicated. 433 U.S. at 224-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
25. 433 U.S. at 224-25 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In noting Delaware's 
failure to enact such a statute, the Court specifically referred to long-arm statutes enacted by other 
states which provided that a director consents to the incorporating state's jurisdiction when he accepts 
the directorship. Id at 216 n.47; see note 39 infra (citing pre-Sha.lfer cases upholding constitutionality 
of state long-arm statutes reaching nonresident corporate directors). 
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that they might be haled before a Delaware court.26 
Shqffer thus invalidated Delaware's primary method of obtaining jurisdic-
tion over nonresident directors of its corporations.27 The Delaware General 
Corporation Law Committee of the Delaware Bar Association saw the situa-
tion created by Shajfer as a vacuum that needed to be filled by legislation 
restoring jurisdiction.28 The Committee also viewed the Court's references to 
other states' director-consent statutes as an invitation to enact a nonresident 
director-consent-to-service statute. 29 
The Committee's primary justification for the statute was the internal affairs 
rule, which provides that a chartering state's law generally governs the fiduci-
ary duties of the corporation's directors.30 The Committee anticipated that 
without some means of securing jurisdiction over nonresident directors, juris-
diction rules would generally preclude Delaware courts from adjudicating 
cases arising under that law, although choice of law considerations would dic-
tate the application of Delaware law.31 Thus, tribunals chosen by plaintiffs 
would be forced to speculate about how the Delaware courts would resolve the 
dispute.32 Moreover, the Committee anticipated that aggrieved shareholders 
would be deprived of the opportunity to bring all corporate defendants to-
gether in one forum.33 
The Delaware General Assembly enacted the recommended statute without 
dissent.34 The new statute treats the acceptance of a position as a director of a 
Delaware-chartered corporation as implied consent to Delaware jurisdiction in 
causes of action arising from the director's duties to the corporation.35 The 
26. 433 U.S. at 216. 
27. Jacobs & Stargatt, The New Delaware Director Consent-to-Service Statute, 33 Bus. LAW. 701,701 
(1978). 
28. Id The authors of the article were members of the Committee. I d. at 701 n.3. 
29. Id. at 705. 
30. See id. at 703 n.33 (except when federal law preempts field, state law governs internal affairs) 
(citing Cart v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). The internar affairs rule provides that a chartering state's Jaws 
govern the fiduciary duties of corporate directors unless a different state has greater interest in the 
matter. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 309 (1979); see notes 138-41/nfta and ac• 
companying text (discussing choice oflaw principles that might indicate application of law other than 
chartering state). 
31. Jacobs & Stargatt,.rupra note 27, at 605;see Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 650 (if Delaware 
long-arm statute unconstitutional, choice of law iules usually would dictate application of Delaware 
law by non-Delaware courts). 
32. Jacobs & Stargatt, supra note 27, at 705. 
33. Id (without director-consent statute, shareholder would have to sue different directors in differ· 
ent states or select a target director; defendant selected could not implead other directors not in same 
forum); see Ratner & Schwartz, .rupra.note 5, at 650 (if Delaware long-arm statute unconstitutional and 
shareholder unable to bring derivative suit anywhere else, shareholder might be denied remedy). 
34. Jacobs & Stargatt, .rul'.ra note 27, at 705. 
35. Id. The statute provzdes in part: 
(e]very nomesident of (Delaware] who ... accepts election or appointment as a director ..• 
of a corporation organized under the laws of [Delaware] or who ... serves in such a capacity 
. . . shall, by such acceptance or by such service, be deemed to have consented to the appoint· 
ment of the registered agent of the corporation (or, if there is none, the Secretary of State) as 
his agent upon whom service of process may be made in all civil actions or proceedings 
against such director for violation of his duty in such capacity. . . . Such acceptance or serv· 
ice as a director . . . shall be a signification of the consent of such director . • . that any 
process so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served upon such director 
within (Delaware]. 
DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (1980). 
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statute vastly expands the Delaware courts' ability to reach nonresident corpo-
rate directors by permitting Delaware courts to exercise in personam jurisdic-
tion over all nonresident directors of Delaware-chartered corporations. Under 
the sequestration method of obtaining jurisdiction, on the other hand, Dela-
ware courts had been able to reach only those directors who owned stock in the 
corporations they directed.36 The statute thus reasserts the jurisdictional au-
thority the Shqffer Court destroyed when it invalidated the sequestration 
method of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident corporate directors. 
II. THE LAW OF MINIMUM CONTACTS AND THE ROLE OF THE LONG-ARM 
STATUTE 
Delaware's enactment of the director-consent statute presupposes that a 
long-arm statute can provide sufficient contacts between a defendant and a 
forum to render the forum's assertion of jurisdiction constitutional.37 Although 
the Delaware legislature viewed the Shqffer Court's reference to other director-
consent statutes as an invitation to enact a similar statute,38 this language is 
open to other interpretation. 39 Whether the absence of the statute was crucial 
to the decision that Delaware lacked in personam jurisdiction over the defend-
ants depends on the role a long-arm statute plays in the minimum contacts 
analysis. 
In an attempt to answer this question, this section examines the genesis and 
growth of the minimum contacts analysis. The section demonstrates that mini-
mum contacts analysis requires a threshold finding of the defendant's pur-
poseful acts in connection with the forum before the state's interests in 
asserting jurisdiction become relevant. This section applies this analysis to 
nonresident corporate directors whose only connection with the forum state is 
acceptance of a directorship in a state-chartered corporation and argues that 
because acceptance of a directorship does not constitute a purposeful act, the 
statute is unconstitutional. 
A. THE GENESIS OF MINIMUM CONTACTS 
The United States Supreme Court initially defined the role of minimum 
36. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1974). Because Delaware law does not require corporate direc-
tors to own stock in the corporations they direct, id tit. 8, § 14l(b) (Supp. 1976), some directors of 
. Delaware corporations do not own stock in their corporations. The Shqffer plaintiff asserted jurisdic-
tion only over those directors who owned stock in the corporation. 433 U.S. at 192 n.8. 
37. Jacobs & Stargatt, Sllpra note 27, at 705; see Jacobs, Personal Jurisdiction Over Corporate Officers 
and .Directors: Recent .Developments, 4 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 690, 693 (1979) (Shqffer court indicated result 
might have been different ifihere had been applicable long-arm statute); notes 71-78 infra and accom-
panying text (discussing effect of statute on due process analysis). 
38. Jacobs & Stargatt, st~pra note 27, at 705. 
39. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 70, 161 (1977) (Shqffer holding implicitly 
rejects fictitious consent as sufficient minimum contacts, leaving constitutionality of such statutes in 
doubt). In decisions prior to Shqffer, courts had upheld director-consent-to-service statutes. See 
Wagenberg v. Charleston Wood Products, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 745,748 (E.D.S.C. 1954) (upholding con-
stitutionality of South Carolina consent-to-service statute; acts complained of occurred within forum); 
Well v. B(!resth, 26 Conn. Supp. 428, 428, 225 A.2d 826, 827 (Super. Ct. 1966) (defendant who uses state 
for economic benefit cannot avoid jurisdiction by virtue of nonresidency; opinion fails to enumerate 
contacts with state). These decisions, however, did not apply a minimum contacts analysis to these 
statutes. See notes 49-70 infra and accompanying text (discussing minimum contacts analysis). 
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contacts analysis in International Shoe Co. v. Washington .40 In International 
Shoe, the Court established that a nonresident defendant's contacts with the 
forum could warrant the forum's exercise of jurisdiction and that the defend-
ant's activities within the state could create such contacts.41 The Court rejected 
the defendant corporation's contention that because the corporation was not 
located within the forum, the assertion of jurisdiction over it violated due pro-
cess.42 The Supreme Court ruled that the corporation's regular solicitation of 
business43 provided "such contacts, ties and relations" between the defendant 
and the forum that made the forum's exercise of jurisdiction reasonable and 
just.44 The Court gave no examples of other ways in which such contacts might 
be established,45 and its decision did not preclude the possibility that other 
factors, such as a state's interest in adjudicating the matter, might be equally 
capable of creating the necessary minimum contacts.46 
Because the International Shoe Court did not delineate the boundaries of the 
minimum contacts analysis, it left room for speculation about the nature and 
components of the minimum contacts test.47 Although the Court stated that 
40. 326 u.s. 310 (1945). 
41. Id at 316. 
42. /d. at 315. The State of Washington initiated the suit to collect contributions the corporation 
allegedly owed to Washington's unemployment compensation fund. Id at 311. The defendant was a 
Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. /d. at 313. The de-
fendant relied on an earlier Supreme Court decision, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), which held 
that a state can exercise in personam jurisdiction only over residents of that state. /d. at 721-22. The 
International Shoe decision effectively overruled Pennoyer. See 326 U.S. at 316 (in determining 
whether exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendant comports with due process notions of fair 
play and substantial justice, courts should examine relationship of defendant to forum state). 
43. 326 U.S. at 313-14. The corporation's salesmen lived in Washington and did most of their work 
for the corporation in Washington./d. 
44. /d. at 320. Although International Shoe purportedly changed the focus of a court's jurisdictional 
inquiry from the physical boundaries of a state to the relationship between the defendant and the 
forum, a court still must examine the territorial limits of the state in determining whether jurisdictional 
assertions comport with due process requirements. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
u.s. 286, 292-93 (1980). 
45. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the IJue Process Clause and the In Personam Jurlsdlcllon oftlte 
State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 623 (1958) (Court's use 
of terms "reasonableness" and "fair play" is conclusory). The Court did indicate that factors other than 
the defendant's activities in the state were relevant to the analysis, e.g., the amount of money the de· 
fend!Ult earned through transactions with the state's citizens, 326 U.S. at 315; the amount of inconve-
nience the defendant would experience in defending a suit away from home, id at 317, and the benefits 
the defendant received from the state's laws. ld at 319. Nevertheless, the Court did not make clear 
whether the defendant's in-state activities in International Shoe were a prere~uisite to jurisdiction or 
just one of several factors that could warrant jurisdiction. The Court did establish two dtstinct levels of 
contacts: the minimal contacts that support jurisdiction in suits arisin& out of the activities that underlie 
the claim, and the greater quantum of contact required to support junsdiction over the defendant in an 
unrelated cause of action./d at 317; see notes 68-70 i'!fra and accompanying text (discussing general 
and specific jurisdiction). 
46. 326 U.S. at 319. 
47. Compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 443, 176 N.E.2d 
761,766 (1961) (due process satisfied when jurisdiction asserted by forum where both parties can most 
conveniently settle their dispute) and Note, Personal Jurisdiction: A New Look at Old Tests, 65 CALIF. 
L. REv. 257, 266 (1977) Qogic of International Shoe demands balancing of all relevant interests rather 
than merely looking at defendant's contacts with forum to determine jurisdiction) and Note, Tlte 
Growth of the International Shoe IJoctrlne, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 523, 524 (1949) (Internallonal Sltoe 
requires balancing of interests to determine reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction) with Buckeye 
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal 2d 893, 899, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 (1969) (Interna-
tional Shoe established two-step analysis; after determining that defendant has acted purposefully 
within forum state, court must balance inconvenience to defendant against plaintiff's interest in suing 
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factors other than the defendant's activities within the state were relevant to 
the minimum contacts inquiry,48 it did not explain the relative significance of 
these factors. The Court thus left open the question whether the minimum 
contacts analysis requires a threshold finding of purposeful acts, such as those 
present in International Shoe, or permits a strong and properly expressed state 
interest to compensate for a paucity of the defendant's purposeful acts. 
B. CLARIFICATION OF THE MINIMUM CONTACTS TEST 
The Court clarified the minimum contacts test in McGee v. International Ltfe 
Insurance Co. 49 and Hanson v . .Denckla.50 Under McGee and.Denckla, a court 
may consider the interest of the state in asserting jurisdiction over the nonresi-
dent only in those cases where the court finds that the defendant has acted 
purposefully and unilaterally to create a contact with the state. The analysis 
thus clearly defines the role of the state's interests in determining whether an 
individual has minimum contacts with the forum. 
McGee involved a suit by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy issued by 
the nonresident defendant insurance company. 5 1 The defendant's only contact 
with the forum was a solicitation of an insurance policy renewal from the 
plaintifl's decedent, who had lived in the forum. 52 The Supreme Court upheld 
jurisdiction over the nonresident despite the paucity of contacts between the 
defendant and the forum.53 1n reaching its holding, the Court weighed a vari-
ety of factors, including the forum's explicit interest in providing effective 
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refused to pay claims. 54 
McGee indicates that when a defendant's acts connecting him with the fo-
rum state are few, a state's interests in protecting its citizens may compensate 
for that de.ficiency.55 Although the McGee defendant had never entered the 
state and had performed only one act related to the forum, he had, by that act, 
purposefully connected himself with a resident of the forum state. 56 Only after 
locally and state's interest in assuming jurisdiction) and Garfinkel & Lavine, Long Arm Jurisdiction in 
Cal!fornia under New Section 410.10 oft he Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HAsTINGS L.J. 1163, 1200 (1970) 
(no balancing of interests required; International Shoe suggests that jurisdiction is reasonable when 
defendant has sufficient contacts with state). For a discussion of some of these theories and a recom-
mendation that the various factors in the analysis be relegated to the position of considerations, rather 
than requirements, see Comment, Minimum Contacts Confosed and ReConfosed-Variations on a Theme 
by International Shoe-Or, Is This Trip Necessary?, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 304 (1970). 
48. See note 45 supra (discussing oilier factors Supreme Court indicated were relevant to determina-
tion of jurisdiction). 
49. 355 u.s. 220 (1957). 
50. 357 u.s. 235 (1958). 
51. 355 U.S. at 221. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 223. 
54. I d. at 222-24. The Court identified other factors that supported jurisdiction in the case. First, the 
Court noted the general increase in the number of commerciiif transactions by maiL I d. at 223. Thus, 
the defendant's physical absence from the state did not rule out jurisdiction. The Court also pointed 
out that improvements in transportation reduce the burdens to the nonresident defendant required to 
defend in a distant forum. I d. Finally, the Court stated that in suits arising from insurance contracts, 
important witnesses were most likely to be in the insured's state. I d. Inconvenience to the defendant, 
. therefore, was not enough to violate due process. I d. at 224. 
55. See id at 223-24 (implying that contact sufficient because state has manifest interest in providing 
forum for citizens in such cases; state had expressed interest explicitly in statute). 
56. See id (contract delivered in forum, preiniums mailed from forum, and insured resided in forum 
when he died). 
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establishing the defendant's purposeful act did the Court consider the state's 
interests in adjudicating the suit. McGee thus represents the first step in the 
Court's creation of a threshold purposeful act requirement. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Hanson v . .Denck/a57 further clarified the 
threshold requirement. The Hanson plaintiffs attempted to rely on McGee to 
obtain jurisdiction over a trustee who did not reside within the forum. 58 The 
disputed trust had been created in the trustee's state, and the settlor had subse-
quently moved to the forum state.59 The Court, however, distinguished Mc-
Gee, pointing out that the trustee inHanson had not performed any acts in the 
forum comparable to the McGee defendant's solicitation. 60 The Court rejected 
the argument that the interests of the state in settling estates61 and of the par-
ties who would be affected by the resolution of the suit could compensate for 
the trustee's failure to conduct business in connection with the state.62 Rather, 
the issue had to be resolved by evaluating the nonresident trustee's acts before 
considering the interests of the state and the other parties. 63 
The Court's decisions in McGee and Hanson demonstrate that minimum 
contacts analysis requires a threshold determination that the defendant acted 
purposefully to create a contact with the forum state.64 When the defendant's 
activities in connection with the state are sufficient to constitute a purposeful 
act, but are insufficient, without more, to permit the forum to exercise jurisdic-
tion, state interests may compensate for the defendant's minimal contacts.65 
57. 357 u.s. 235 (1958). 
58. Id. at 250-51. 
59. I d. at 238. Several years after moving to the forum, the settlor died. I d. at 239. The suit involved 
a dispute between the trust beneficiaries and those who would take the trust assets under the residuary 
clause of the settlor's will if the trust were declared invalid. I d. at 240. 
60. Id. at 252. 
61. Id at 253-54. 
62. Id at 254. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black argued that the state's interest in resolving 
disputes concerning the settlor's estate should weigh in favor of jurisdiction over the trustee. He em-
phasized that the trustee had voluntarily chosen to maintain a business relationship with the settlor for 
eight years after the settlor moved to the forum. Id at 258-59. 
63. Id at 253. 
64. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (fortuitous circum-
stances connecting defendant with forum do not provide required contacts; defendant's acts must cause 
contacts); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) (sufficient contacts are established only by acts 
of defendant); Folk & Moyer, Sefjllestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 13 CoLUM. L. RI!V. 
749, 798-99 (1973) (Supreme Court has held nonresidents may be subject to suit when defendant's 
activities of particular interest to state); Gorfinkel & Lavine, Long Arm Jurlsdlcllon in California under 
New Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1163, 1192 (1970) (defendant, and 
not some third party, must initiate the contacts between the state and himself; no balancing test re-
quired); Louis, The Grasp oJ Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C. L. Rl!v. 407, 422 (1980) (from 
Hanson to World-Wide Volkswagen, Court developed bifurcated jurisdiction inquiry, requiring 
threshold finding of defendant's contacts with the forum); Note, The Long-Arm Shrinks: The Supreme 
Court and the Problem of the Nonresident Defendant in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 58 DI!N. 
LJ. 667, 674 (1981) (conduct of defendant creates necessary affiliating circumstances for jurisdiction). 
65. q: Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modern Pte· 
diction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARIZ. L. Rl!v. 861, 883 (1978) (legiti-
mate state interest may be additional prerequisite to jurisdiction); Developments in the Low: Slate Court 
Jurisdiction, 73 HAR.v. L. Rl!v. 909, 924 (1960) (mconvenience to defendant weighed against state and 
plaintifi's interests to determine whether assertion of jurisdiction fair); Note, Personal Jurisdiction: A 
New Look at Old Tests, 65 CALIF. L. Rl!v. 257, 266 (1977) (International Shoe requires courts to bal-
ance interests in determining whether defendant has sufficient contacts); Note, Measuring the Long Arm 
oJter Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rl!v. 126, 127 (1978) (Shqffer court suggests long arm statute 
may enable otherwise insufficient contacts to satisfy due process). 
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State interests, however, may not supplant completely the purposeful acts 
requirement. 66 
Once the defendant's acts meet the threshold test, the quality and quantity of 
those acts may be placed on a continuum.67 At one end of the continuum are 
contacts sufficient to warrant general jurisdiction.68 At the other end are con-
tacts that pass the threshold test, but are so meager that other compelling inter-
ests must be present to justify the assertion of jurisdiction. 69 When the 
defendant's contacts with the forum are minimal, a strong and properly ex-
pressed state interest may permit the court to assert jurisdiction.70 
In sum, the Supreme Court has. established a minimum contacts require-
ment for state court assertions of jurisdiction over nonresidents. In order to 
find such contacts, a state court must first determine whether the defendant's 
acts connecting him with the state are sufficient to meet the threshold pur-
poseful act requirement. If they are, the court may go on to weigh the quantity 
and quality of the defendant's purposeful acts against the other relevant 
interests. 
C. APPLICATION OF THE MINIMUM CONTACTS TEST TO NONRESIDENT 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 
Two aspects of Shaffer's minimum contacts analysis indicate that Dela-
ware's enactment of the director-consent statute does not overcome the due 
process problems that resulted in the Court's invalidation of the sequestration 
procedure. First, Shqffer follows the minimum contacts analysis developed in 
McGee and Hanson. Application of this analysis to the nonresident corporate 
directors who have no other connection with the forum state reveals that Dela-
ware's enactment of a long-arm statute does not cure the absence of the thresh-
old requirement of a purposeful act. Second, the Delaware legislature 
misinterpreted the Shaffer Court's discussion of Delaware's failure to enact a 
66. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (although forum has 
strong interest in applying its law to controversy, due process divests state of power to assert jurisdiction 
when defendant has no contacts with state); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 100 (1978) (although 
forum has substantial interests in protecting resident children in action for support, state cannot assert 
jurisdiction over nonresident father who derives no benefit from children's presence in state and who 
has no other contact with state). 
67. See Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 899, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. · 
113, 118 (1969) (after establishing that defendant engaged in activity of requisite quality and nature in 
forum state and that cause of action connected sufficiently with activity, court should balance inconve-
nience to defendant against interests ou;::tiff to determine whether to assert Jurisdiction). 
68. See Perkins v. Benguet ConsoL · g Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952) (if defendant's contacts 
are substantial, but cause of action unrelated to contacts, jurisdiction constitutional); International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,318 (1945) (in some cases defendant's continuous operations in state 
so substantial and of such a nature as to justify jurisdiction in suits unrelated to activities). 
69. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (if defendant's activities in 
state give rise to liabilities involved in suit, defendant deemed present for jurisdictional purposes); Hess 
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (when state has expressed by statute regulatory interest in particu-
larly dangerous activity, defendant subject to state's jurisdiction under long-arm statute). See generally 
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: IJue Process Limitations on Stale Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SuP. CT. 
REv. 77, 82-88 (discussing difference between jurisdiction based on continuous activity unrelated to suit 
and contacts related to suit). 
70. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. at 223 (state has manifest interest in providing 
residents with forum for redress against insurers refusing to pay claims); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 
356 (1927) (statute resulting from strong state regulatory interest in highway safety warrants state juris-
diction in suits arising from nonresidents' use of highways). 
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long-arm statute; the Court did not indicate that such a statute would compen-
sate for the virtual absence of the defendants' purposeful acts. 
The enactment of the director-consent statute does not affect the Shaffer 
Court's minimum contacts analysis. The Court rejected the contention that 
Delaware's interest in supervising the management of its corporations justified 
Delaware jurisdiction.71 Further, the Court determined that a nonresident's 
acceptance of a directorship in a Delaware corporation did not constitute a 
sufficient purposeful act.72 The Court's refusal to consider state interests as a 
justification for asserting jurisdiction without a threshold finding of the de-
fendant's purposeful act is thus consistent with the McGee-Hanson analysis. 
Because a long-arm statute merely reflects the state's interests in asserting ju-
risdiction, the statute does not alter the due process requirement that led the 
Shaffer Court to invalidate the sequestration procedure.73 Proof of the state's 
interest in adjudicating a matter does not substitute for the constitutional re-
quirement of a purp'oseful act. 
Neither of the two contexts in which the Shaffer Court mentioned the ab-
sence of a statute supports the Delaware legislature's view that the opinion 
invited enactment of the long-arm statute. The Court first discussed the failure 
to enact a long-arm statute in refuting the contention that Delaware's strong 
71. 433 U.S. at 215. 
72. Id. at 215-16. The Court reasoned that although Delaware corporation law might provide sub-
stantial benefits to corporate directors, the directors "simply had nothing to do with the State of Dela-
ware." I d. at 216. 
Justice Brennan dissented from Part IV of Shqffer, in which the Court held that acceptance of a 
directorship in a Delaware corporation did not constitute a purposeful act sufficient to create minimum 
contacts. 433 U.S. at 216-17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan 
stated that the defendants' voluntary relationship with a Delaware corporation should constitute suffi-
cient minimum contacts with Delaware. Id. at 227-28. The lower courts have disagreed on whether 
acceptance of a directorship is a sufficient contact with the forum state. See Miller v. American Tel. & 
TeL Co., 394 F. Supp. 58, 63 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (statute permitting jurisdiction over persons whose out· 
of-state acts cause harm in state may not permit jurisdiction over nonresident director whose breach of 
fiduciary duty causes indirect harm to shareholder), qffd mem., 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976); Lawson v. 
Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 298 F. Supp. 373, 377-79 (D. Md. 1969) (because nonresident direc-
tors' decisions carried out within forum, forum may exercise jurisdiction over directors; open question 
whether defendants' status as directors of corporation chartered by forum would be sufficient); cf. 
Ellwein v. Sun-Rise, Inc., 295 Minn. 109, 110, 203 N.W.2d 403, 405 (1972) Oong-arm statute adequate 
to permit assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident directors of corporation with home in 
forum; fact that defendants never entered forum not decisive when no more convenient forum exists). 
73. Couching the Delaware statute in terms of consent adds nothing to the due process analysis. See, 
e.g., Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953) (implied consent has no constitutional 
significance absent minimum contacts); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,318 (1945) 
(when corporations held amenable to suit based on implied consent, corporations' acts justify fiction of 
consent); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1085-89 (D. Kan. 1978) (exercise of 
jurisdiction based on governmentally imposed consent cannot be sustained absent minimum contacts). 
But see Jacobs, supra note 37, at 696 (consent is independent basis for asserting state court jurisdiction; 
no difference between signing consent form and accepting directorship with knowledge of conse· 
quences). 
Voluntary consent to jurisdiction would legitimize an assertion of jurisdiction in the absence of mini-
mum contacts. q: D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972) (consent valid when 
defendant voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived rights). A person's waiver of his constitu-
tional right not to be subjected to the jurisdiction of a state with which he lacks minimum contacts, 
however, is not voluntary when the state has elicited the waiver by offering a benefit otherwise to be 
withheld. Cf. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967) (when state offers benefit conditioned 
on relinquishment of constitutional right, relinquishment not truly voluntary); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (state may not apply eligibility provisions for unemployment benefits to compel 
worker to abandon religious convictions). 
HeinOnline -- 70 Geo. L. J. 1219 1981-1982
1982] DIRECTOR-CONSENT STATUTE 1219 
interest justified its assertion of jurisdiction.74 The Court pointed to the ab-
sence of a long-arm statute as an indication that Delaware's interest in adjudi-
cating suits involving nonresident corporate directors was not as strong as 
claimed.75 The court went on to emphasize that, even if Delaware did have a 
strong interest in such litigation, that interest might warrant the application of 
Delaware law to the controversy, t?ut could not justify the assertion of jurisdic-
tion over nonresident directors. 76 
The Court also referred to the absence of a long-arm statute in rejecting the 
argument that acceptance of a directorship satisfied the minimum contacts re-
quirement.77 The CQurt observed that the defendants had not" 'purposefully 
avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
state."'78 They not only had failed to perform any act in connection with Dela-
ware, but they also "had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware 
court" because Delaware had not enacted a director-consent statute.79 Thus, 
the state's attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the nonresidents posed the ad-
ditional problem of lack of notice. The reference to the absence of a long-arm 
statute was an afterthought, not an iinplication that providing notice would 
remedy the absence of minimum contacts. 
McGee, Hanson, and Shaffer make clear that the state's interests do not 
enter into minimum contacts analysis until the defendant's acts meet this 
threshold requirement. Shaffer also clearly indicates that a nonresident's ac-
ceptance of a directorship in a corporation chartered by the forum does not 
satisfy the threshold purposeful act requirement. Unless, contrary to the 
Supreme Court's finding in Shaffer, acceptance of a directorship does consti-
tute the requisite purposeful act, the Delaware statute suffers from the same 
constitutional infirmities as the sequestration procedure. 
Ill. THE DEFINITION OF PURPOSEFUL Acr 
In Shaffer, the Supreme Court did not articulate why acceptance of a direc-
torship did not constitute a sufficient purposeful act.80 The Court's silence 
leaves room for speculation about the essential ingredients of the required act. 
This section therefore examines the nature of the purposeful act requirement 
and argues that Shaffer correctly concluded that acceptance of a directorship 
was not a sufficient purposeful act. 
Courts usually characterize purposeful acts in terms of their results. For ex-
74. 433 U.S. at 214-15. 
75. Id The Court stated: "If Delaware perceived its interest in securing jurisdiction over COC£0rate 
fiduciaries to be as great as Heitner suggests, we would expect it to have enacted a statute more clearly 
designed to protect that interest." Id 
76. Id at 216. 
77. Id at 215-16. 
78. Id at 215. 
79. Id at 216. 
80. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAR.v. L. REv. 70, 161 (1977) (S!tqffer Court implicitly 
rejected defendant's voluntary association with state-created entity and state interest in supervising 
affairs of its corporations as bases for upholding nonresident director-consent-to-service statutes). 
As Justice Brennan noted, in concluding that acceptance of a directorship did not consititute a suffi-
cient purposeful act, the Court was ''unable to draw upon a proper factual record" because the trial 
court had not considered the minimum contacts issue. 433 U.S. at 220 (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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ample, a corporation may commit purposeful acts by availing itself of the ben-
efits and protections of the incorporating state's laws and reaping significant 
economic returns.81 Another result of purposeful acts is that the defendant can 
reasonably foresee being haled before the tribunals of the state. 82 The primary 
results of purposeful acts thus include economic gain, reliance on and benefit 
from state law, and foreseeability of suits within the forum. Arguably, any act 
that has these results is, by definition, a purposeful act. 
Whether a nonresident defendant benefits from the laws of the forum is a 
question that arises most often in cases involving foreign corporations rather 
than individuals.83 State laws conducive to successful business enterprises con-
fer benefits on foreign corporations that do business in the forum.84 Foreign 
corporations also benefit from laws that grant access to state courts to enforce 
corporate rights against a resident. 85 Fairness requires, therefore, that a state's 
citizens have recourse to the state's courts to redress wrongs committed by a 
nonresident corporation. 86 When a foreign corporation gains significant eco-
nomic and legal benefits from conducting activity within the state, it is reason-
able to infer from these results the corporation's purposeful act in obtaining 
such benefits. 
Directors of corporations also may derive substantial benefits from a state's 
laws without ever entering the state or dealing directly with its residents. Al-
though a director may conduct his business activities in another state, he de-
rives his power from the laws of the state of incorporation. 87 Delaware's laws 
in particular give broad powers, 88 as well as many personal advantages, 89 to its 
corporations' directors. Because such benefits are the result of the act of ac-
cepting a directorship, such an act arguably could constitute a purposeful act 
sufficient to validate a chartering state's assertion of jurisdiction.90 
81. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (to extent corporation con-
ducts activities in state, it enjoys benefits and protections of state laws; fair to require it to defend suit 
based on such l:?enefits); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 902, 458 P.2d 57, 64, 80 
Cal Rptr. ll3, 120 (1969) (defendant corporation's economic benefit from state supports finding that it 
has purposefully engaged in economic activity in forum). 
82. q. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978) (no jurisdiction when defendant could not 
have foreseen being haled into forum). 
83. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 227 (1957) (defendant out-of-state 
insurance company solicited contract renewal from state resident); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 
339 U.S. 643, 646 (1950) (defendant out-of-state insurance company solicited insurance contract from 
state resident); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313 (1945) {defendant out-of-state 
shoe manufacturer's agents solicited orders from state residents). 
84. See note 81 supra (discussing financial benefits that accrue to nonresident corporation). But cf. 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (financial benefits accruing to 
defendant from collateral relation to forum do not support jurisdiction if they do not stem from consti-
tutionally cognizable contacts with the state). 
85. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). 
86. See id. (discussing fairness of state enforcement of foreign corporation's obligations to state 
residents). 
87. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (1974) (directors have power to manage affairs of 
corporation). 
88. See Note, Measuring the Long Arm After Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 126, 132-33 & 
n.SO (1978) (Delaware law pro-management because management allowed broad power and permits 
shareholders to increase management's authority). 
89. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (1974) (directors allowed interest-free, unsecured loans from 
corporation); id. § 145 (indemnification in actions arising from activities as director). 
90. See Note, Measuring the Long Arm After Shaffer v. Heitner, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126, 132-33 
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The legal and financial benefits directors receive as a result of incorporation 
in a particular state, however, do not justify the inference that acceptance of a 
directorship is a purposeful act. Corporate directors often do not choose the 
state of incorporation; many directors do not even join the board until after the 
corporation's organizers have chosen a chartering state.91 The financial bene-
fits and legal protections that directors receive are collateral benefits that ac-
crue from an indirect relationship with the forum state.92 As the Court in 
World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 93 observed, such indirect benefits 
are insufficient to satisfy the purposeful act requirement.94 Rather, directors 
must deliberately avail themselves of the benefits of the forum state. 
The foreseeability that one may be called into the courts of a particular fo-
rum is also insufficient, without more, to meet the purposeful act requirement. 
By enacting a long-arm statute, Delaware provided the foreseeable result that 
nonresident corporate directors might be called into Delaware courts. A state's 
assertion of jurisdiction, however, is not valid merely because the defendant 
can foresee the possibility of suit in that forum.95 If this were the case, states 
could obtain jurisdiction over all nonresidents simply by enacting long-arm 
statutes purporting to authorize personal jurisdiction over all nonresidents. 
Although purposeful acts often are defined by their results, not all behavior 
that results in .financial gain, legal benefit and foreseeability of suits within the 
forum state constitute a purposeful act. The Supreme Court rejected this con-
tention in World- Wide Volkswagen .96 A sound basis thus exists for the Court's 
conclusion in Shaffer that acceptance of a directorship does not constitute a 
sufficient act for the minimum contacts test.97 A purposeful act is a required 
component of the minimum contacts analysis, and acceptance of a directorship 
does not qualify as such a purposeful act. Thus, the Delaware nonresident 
(1978) (benefits and protections corporate directors knowingly reap should provide constitutionally suf-
ficient basis for jurisdiction). 
91. Directors, of course, sometimes may be responsible for deciding to reincorporate in another 
forum. 
92. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court stated that an Oklahoma court could not assert jurisdic-
tion over an automobile dealer who did business in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. 444 U.S. 
at 298. The Court concluded that although the defendants received "substantial revenue" as a result of 
sales of automobiles that could travel to Oklahoma and be serviced by Volkswagen service facilities, 
such financial benefits were the result of a "collateral relation" to the forum state. Id at 299. Because 
such benefits did not stem from a "constitutionally cognizable contact" with Oklahoma, they could not 
support jurisdiction. Id Similarly, when a nonresident corporate director accepts a directorship in a 
Delaware corporation, he obtains legal and financial benefits as a result of a collateral, indirect rela-
tionship with the forum state. Thus, the benefits that directors receive are "too attenuated a contact to 
justify [a) State's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over them." Id 
93. 444 u.s. 286 (1980). 
94. See id at 299 (financial benefits accruing to defendant from collateral relation to forum do not 
support jurisdiction if they do not stem from constitutionally copnzable contacts with forum); Kulko v. 
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (father who merely acqwesces in daughter's decision to live with 
mother in forum state does not purposefully avail himself of benefits and protections of forum's laws). 
95. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (foreseeability alone is 
not sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: the End of an Era, 53 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 66 (1978) (reasonable expectations of the parties have always been element of 
International Shoe test, but statute has never defined expectations). 
96. See notes 92-94 supra and accompanying text (discussing World-Wide Volkswagen). 
97. 433 U.S. at 215-16; see note 21 supra and accompanying text (discussin,g Shaffer Court's finding 
that acceptance of directorship does not constitute purposeful act under minimum contacts analysis). 
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director-consent-to-service statute is unconstitutional in its application to non-
resident directors who have no other ties with the state. 
IV. ARMSTRONG V. POMERANCE: DELAWARE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS 
THE CONSENT-TO-SERVICE STATUTE 
The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the consent-to-service statute in 
Armstrong v. Pomerance .98 In Armstrong, the court determined that the statute 
remedied the minimum contacts problems posed by the sequestration proce-
dure.99 Contrary to the clear implication in Shqffer that acceptance of a direc-
torship does not constitute a purposeful act, the Delaware court held that by 
accepting directorships in Delaware corporations, the defendants had purpose-
fully availed themselves of the benefits of Delaware's laws.l00 An analysis of 
Armstrong reveals that its reasoning is at odds with the Supreme Court's mini-
mum contacts analysis. 
The Armstrong defendants were directors of a Delaware corporation whose 
principal place of business was in Boise, Idaho.101 None of the directors lived 
or conducted business in Delaware.102 In asserting that Delaware had jurisdic-
tion, the plaintiff relied solely on the defendants' election as directors of the 
Delaware corporation.103 The defendants maintained that the statute was un-
constitutional as applied to them. 104 Relying on Shqffer, they argued that mere 
status as a director is not a sufficient contact to support in personam 
jurisdiction.tos 
The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the consent-to-service statute.to6 Al-
though articulated in terms of fairness rather than minimum contacts, the Del-
aware Court's reasoning appeared to follow the Supreme Court's purposeful 
act and state interest balancing analysis.107 Under the court's reasoning, by 
accepting directorships in a Delaware corporation and receiving significant 
benefits and protections under Delaware law, the defendants committed the 
purposeful acts necessary to support in personam jurisdiction.108 The court 
next concluded that because Delaware had a significant interest in actively 
overseeing the conduct of those owing fiduciary duties to shareholders of Dela-
ware corporations, the exercise of jurisdiction was fair. 109 
In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized that Delaware law empow-
ered the defendants to act in their capacity as directors, and that the transac-
98. 423 A.2d 174 (Del. 1980). 
99. Id at 178-79. 
100. Id at 176. 
101. Id. at 175. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. The court dismissed the suit against those defendants who had accepted their positions 
before the effective date of the consent-to-service statute. I d. 
104. Id at 176. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 178-79. 
107. See notes 64-70 supra and accompanying text (discussing purposeful act requirement and sig-
nificance of state interest in minimum contacts analysis). 
108. 423 A.2d at 176. 
109. See id at 176-77 (requirement that defendants impliedly consent to Delaware jurisdiction not 
unreasonable provided that consent requirement serves legitimate purpose). 
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tion challenged in the suit arose from their activities as directors.11o In 
addition, unlike the Shqffer defendants, the directors in Armstrong had explicit 
notice through the consent statute that Delaware courts could exercise jurisdic-
tion over them in suits that involved their acts as directors.m The court thus 
asserted that the defendants' acts satisfied the purposeful act requirement and 
balanced the state's interests in asserting jurisdiction. 
The Armstrong court, however, failed to follow the Supreme Court's mini-
mum contacts analysis in holding the statute constitutional. The Del~ware 
court balanced state interests without actually satisfying the purposeful act re-
quirement. The court rejected Shqffer's conclusion that acceptance of a direc-
torship does ·not constitute a purposeful act sufficient to satisfy minimum 
contacts.112 The Armstrong court instead implied that because the directors 
derived their power from state law and took advantage of the pro-management 
slant of Delaware's laws, 113 the exercise of jurisdiction was fair. 114 The Shaffer 
Court took note of these same factors, but nonetheless concluded that the pur-
poseful act requirement was not satisfied because the directors "simply had 
nothing to do with the state ofDelaware."115 The court thus rested its conclu-
sion primarily on the strength of Delaware's interest in adjudicating share-
holder derivative suits involving directors of its corporations. 
Even assuming that the plaintiff met the threshold test, however, the consti-
tutional significance of the state interests that the court identified is questiona-
ble.116 The court observed that Delaware has a legitimate interest in 
developing its law through careful judicial interpretation of its statutes117 and 
in providing a judicial forum for aggrieved shareholders.118 The other interests 
identified by the court as justifications for Delaware jurisdiction, however, are 
suspect. These interests include providing a forum for redress of injuries suf-
fered by the corporation and ensuring that Delaware law defines the fiduciary 
duties of Delaware directors.119 
110. Id. at 176. 
Ill. Id. 
112. 433 U.S. at 216; see note 22 supra and accompanying text (discussing Shqffer). 
113. 423 A.2d at 178 (quoting Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 650-51). 
114. 423 A.2d at 176. The court also argued that Shaffir's conclusion that acceptance of a director-
ship is not a sufficent purposeful act to create minimum contacts was "pure dicta" because the mini-
mum contacts issue had not been presented to the lower court. Id at 179; see note 21 supra (discussing 
Justice Brennan's conclusion that the part of Sha.ffer dealing with purposeful acts was merely an "advi-
sory opinion"). The court, however, proceeded to argue that there were "obvious and substantial dis-
tinctions" between Shqffer and Armstrong. 423 A.2d at 179. First, the court observed that the director-
consent statute was unlike the sequestration statute in Shaffer, which based jurisdiction on the defend-
ants' status as shareholders. The director-consent statute derived jurisdiction over actions involving the 
directors' duties to the corporation from the defendants' activities as directors. Id at 179-80. Second, 
the statute provided notice to directors that they could be subject to suits in the incorporating state. Id 
at 180. 
115. 433 U.S. at 215-16. 
116. See Brilmayer, supra note 69, at 105-07 (discussing problems with using state interests as basis 
for jurisdiction); Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 649 (analyzing Delaware's claimed interest in 
supervising corporations). 
117. 423 A.2ii at 177-78; see Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 649-50 (Delaware's real interest, 
attracting corporations through pro-management statutes interpreted by pro-management courts, may 
serve incidental constitutionally significant purpose of ensuring consistent and knowledgable interpre-
tation of the laws). 
118. 423 A.2d at 178; Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 650. 
119. 423 A.2d at 176 n.5. 
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The Armstrong court noted that the corporation was a resident of Delaware 
and that the nonresident directors had injured the corporate resident by 
breaching their fiduciary duties. 120 The court thus suggested that the state's 
interest in providing a forum for shareholder derivative litigation paralleled its 
interest in providing a forum for residents harmed by nonresidents. 121 This 
logic fails, however, because the corporation conducted business in Idaho, not 
in Delaware.l22 The corporation was a resident· of Delaware in only the most 
~echnical sense. 123 
The legitimacy of Delaware's interest in ensuring that Delaware law governs 
suits against Delaware directors poses greater difficulties. Armstrong rejected 
Shaffer's conclusion that although state interests might require the application 
of Delaware law to controversies over the directors' activities, such interests 
did not necessarily permit Delaware to assert jurisdiction.124 The court sug-
gested instead that Delaware should have personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant in the controversy because of the danger that another state might 
apply choice of law principles mandating the use of laws other than Dela-
ware's.125 For instance, choice of law considerations may lead a state to apply 
its own law governing the fiduciary duties of directors to foreign corporations 
doing business in the state.126 The only constitutional limitation on a state 
court's ability to apply its own law is the requirement that a state with no 
interest must apply the law of an interested state.127 Thus, Delaware's interest 
in keeping the case out of forums that might not apply Delaware law is of 
little, if any, constitutional significance. 
V. NONRESIDENT DIRECTORS: THE CASE FOR AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
MINIMUM CONTACTS REQUIREMENT 
TheArmstrong court feared that if the director-consent statute were declared 
unconstitutional, and Delaware courts could not obtain jurisdiction over non-
resident corporate directors, aggrieved shareholders might be deprived com-
pletely of a forum in which to conduct derivative litigation.128 Moreover, the 
Sh'!lfer Court specifically reserved the question whether a forum with which 
the defendant lacked minimum conta~s could exercise jurisdiction if no other 
120. Id. at 176. 
121. Id. at 178-79. 
122. I d. at 175; see Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 648 (concept of personhood of corporation 
stretched beyond reasonable bounds when corporation suffered injury m Delaware because manager in 
another state made decision affecting business operations in third state). 
123. C.f. Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 648 (corporation in Shajftr was not a "victimized locnl 
corporation"). 
124. 423 A.2d at 177 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215-16 (1977)). 
125. 423 A.2d at 177. 
126. See Oldham, .Regulating the .Regulators: Limitations upon a Stale's Ability to .Regulate Corpora-
lions with Multistate Contracts, 5 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 181,202 (1980) (local law sometimes applies to suits 
involving foreign corporations doing business in state). 
127. See Currie, The Constitution and the ''Transitory" Cause of Action, 13 HARV. L. REv. 36, 76 
(1959) (full faith and credit clause requires court of state which has no interest in controversy to apply 
law of interested state). 
128. 423 A.2d at 177-78. The court identified the possibility that shareholders might be deprived of 
any forum at all as one of the "significant ramifications which would undeniably (and unfortunately) 
flow from a conclusion that§ 3114 cannot constitutionally be applied to corporate directors in share-
holder derivative actions." I d. 
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forum were available.129 Necessity, therefore, may warrant an exception to the 
minimum contacts requirement.I3o 
An exercise of jurisdiction, without purposeful contacts by the defendant, 
may be constitutional when denial of jurisdiction would effectively deny the 
plaintiff any forum at all. 131 As the Armstrong court noted, plaintiffs in share-
holder derivative suits may be deprived completely of a forum if the chartering 
state cannot exercise jurisdiction.132 Directors often lack minimum contacts 
with other states in which the corporation can also be sued.133 Thus, the special 
attributes of shareholder derivative litigation frequently may pose circum-
stances in which practical necessity requires an exception to the minimum con-
tacts requirement. 
Although practical necessity may legitimize an exception to the minimum 
contacts requirement, it does not necessarily render the nonresident director-
consent-to-service statute constitutional. Exceptions to constitutionally man-
dated jurisdictional requirements should be granted only in specific cases when 
necessity actually exists. 134 Necessity does not exist in all cases in which the 
Delaware statute would permit the exercise of jurisdiction. Although a general 
exception to the minimum contacts requirement in the cases of all nonresident 
corporate directors would supply certainty and simplicity, nevertheless, it 
would be unsatisfactory. As the Shqffer Court observed, "the cost of simplify-
ing the litigation by avoiding the jurisdictional question may be the sacrifice of 
'fair play and substantial justice.' That cost is too high.''l3s 
Although the necessity exception may permit a state to exercise jurisdiction 
over a defendant who lacks minimum contacts with the state, it does not follow 
that the state of incorporation is the proper state to assert jurisdiction. Choice 
129. 433 U.S. at 211 n.37; see Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950) (state 
should be permitted to maintain suit when maintenance elsewhere might be impossible). 
130. 433 U.S. at 211, n.37. See Dillyort, Jurisdiction over Nonresident JJirectors, 0/Jicers, and Share-
holders: "JJirector"Consenl Statutesajler Shafferv. Heitner, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 255; 287 n.l61 (1979) 
(Shqffer Court's reservation of issue whether jurisdiction based on property in state would satisfY due 
process when no other forum available and approval of status as basis for jursidiction support notion 
that minimum contacts not required in every case). 
Another possible exception to the minimum contacts requirement might be based on the absence of 
inconvenience to defendant nonresident corporate directors. Delaware corporations may indemnity 
directors for expenses, thereby mitigating the inconvenience and expense of defending suits in distant 
forums. DEL CooE. ANN. tit 8, § 145 (1975) (allowing co~ration to repay expenses of officers in-
curred in defending suits resulting from their corporate actiVIties); see Dillport, supra at 289 (discussing 
indemnification as factor mitigating inconvenience to defendant). Although one of the goals of the 
minimum contacts requirement is fairness to the defendant, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310,320 (1945), the Court has rejected the argument that a forum may exercise jurisdiction over a 
defendant who lacks minimum contacts with the forum as long as the forum is a convenient one for the 
defendant. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (even if defend-
ant would suffer no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before tribunals of another state, the 
due process clause may divest forum of jurisdiction where defendant has no minimum contacts). Con-
venience to the defendant, therefore, is an inadequate justification for an exception to the minimum 
contacts requirement 
131. Dillport, supra note 130, at 262. 
132. 423 A.2d at 178 (citing Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 5, at 650-51). 
133. Dillport, supra note 130, at 262. The corporation is usually an indispensible party in share-
holder derivative suits. Id 
134. Cf. Brilmayer, supra note 69, at 108-10 (if exception to minimum contacts requirement granted, 
should be narrowly drawn exception). 
135. 433 U.S. at 211; if. Oldham, supra note 126, at 202 (absurd to sacrifice policy concerns for 
certainty in area of corporate choice of law). 
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of law considerations, such as the state's interest in adjudicating the suit, 136 do 
not require that the incorporating state exercise jurisdiction. Moreover, con-
siderations of fairness and convenience may point to the corporation's princi-
pal place of business as a more appropriate forum.l37 . 
Although choice of law considerations may result in the application of the 
incorporating state's law, such considerations do not always point to the state 
of incorporation as the forum by necessity. As theArmstrong Court noted, the 
incorporating state's law does not necessarily apply to suits arising from 
breaches of fiduciary duties by corporate directors. 138 Choice of law principles 
may require instead that the court apply to such actions the substantive law of 
the state· where the corporation conducts its business.139 The general rule that 
the incorporating state's law governs the duties of directors to the corporation 
is based on the need for a uniform and certain standard, rather than on the 
state's interests in the litigation.14° Choice of law principles, therefore, do not 
justify a constitutional requirement that the incorporating state be the forum 
by necessity, especially if other factors enable prospective defendants to antici-
pate applicable law.l41 
Convenience to corporate directors also supports the principal place of busi-
ness as the forum by necessity. Many corporate boards are composed of insid-
ers who are executives employed by the corporation. 142 Because many 
directors work for the companies-they direct, jurisdiction by necessity in the 
principal place of business is likely to deprive fewer directors of due process 
than would jurisdiction in the state of incorporation in which none of the di-
rectors may live or work. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the minimum contacts test has evolved into a two-stage analysis 
with a threshold purposeful act requirement, a state's interest in adjudicating 
alone cannot support a finding of minimum contacts. The act of accepting a 
directorship does not qualify as a purposeful act and thus cannot move the 
analysis to its second tier. Delaware's nonresident director-consent-to-service 
statute is therefore unconstitutional because it does not satisfy the minimum 
contacts requirement when a defendailt's only purposeful act connecting him 
with the state is the acceptance of a directorship. Shareholder derivative suits, 
however, present a need for an exception to the Court's minimum _contacts 
136. See text accompanying note 76 supra (discussing Slzqjfer Court's analysis of choice of law 
principles). 
137. Cf. Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1947) (under modem 
conditions, corporations obtain charters from states where they do no business; place of corporate dom-
icile in such circumstances entitled to little consideration under doctrine offorum non conveniens). 
138. 423 A.2d at 177. 
139. See Oldham, supra note 126, at 202-04 (commercial domicile has greater interest in corporation 
than chartering state has and therefore should apply its own law). 
140. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 n.44 (1977). 
141. C.f. Oldham, supra note 126, at 202 (uncertainty as to which law will apply rectified by reincor-
porating in state of pnncipal place of business). 
142. See Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293, 302-03 
(1979) (corporations continue to fill their boards with insiders). But if. Dillport, supra note 130, at 264 
(trend toward increase in outsiders on corporate boards). 
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requirement because plaintiffs may be deprived of a forum unless courts per-
mit such an exception. Considerations of fairness and convenience to nonresi-
dent directors suggest that the forum by necessity should be the corporation's 
principal place of business rather than the state of incorporation. 
Susan Stuckert 
